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INVESTMENT AND FINANCE WHEN LIQUIDATION IS COSTLY***
BY
ALLARD BRUINSHOOFD* AND WILKO LETTERIE**
Summary
In this paper we investigate to what extent expected liquidation costs affect the dependence of a firm’s
investment decision on available finance. We hypothesise that comovement of firm and industry sales
measures such costs, which create a premium on external finance and make investment more sensi-
tive to the availability of internal funds. Supportive evidence for this conjecture is obtained from the
investment behaviour of a sample of 206 large Dutch manufacturing firms observed during the period
1983-1996. We also demonstrate that our measure of expected liquidation costs has additional ex-
planatory power over other proxies for the premium on external finance – like leverage, retention
practice and firm size.
Key words: investment, finance, liquidation cost
1 INTRODUCTION
The relevance of the observed connection between investment and finance rises
on the policy agenda when the economic tide turns. An environment of down-
ward revisions of earnings forecasts and accompanied cuts in budgets for corpo-
rate investment serves to re-accentuate how financing constraints at the firm-level
can propagate downturns in the aggregate output growth of an economy. Eco-
nomic downturns furthermore revive the perception of liquidation as possible real-
world events when even large firms see reserves evaporating rapidly.
* Corresponding author: De Nederlandsche Bank, Research Department, P.O. Box 98, 1000 AB Am-
sterdam, The Netherlands.
** Department of Management Sciences, Maastricht University.
*** We thank Bertrand Candelon, Martin Carree, Martin Fase the editor, Clemens Kool, Gerard
Pfann, Fabio Schiantarelli, Elmer Sterken, Bas ter Weel, participants in internal seminars at Maas-
tricht University, BIRC’s seminar on Investment Decisions by Firms, Statistics Netherlands’ seminar
on Dutch Micro-Data Research and the SMYE2000 in Copenhagen and two anonymous referees for
their useful comments. Letterie acknowledges support by the Dutch Foundation for Scientific Re-
search PIONIER program. The research is furthermore supported by a grant from the Maastricht re-
search school on Economics of TEchnology and ORganisations METEOR and was partially carried
out at the Centre for Research of Economic Micro-data CeREM of Statistics Netherlands. The views
expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of Sta-
tistics Netherlands or De Nederlandsche Bank.
DE ECONOMIST 152, NO. 1, 2004
De Economist 152, 21–45, 2004.
© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
In this paper we examine to what extent costly liquidation has an impact on
the dependence of corporate investment on available finance. The underlying idea
is as follows. The firm’s ability to finance planned investment improves if the
firm can provide collateral to a creditor when it takes out a loan. A firm is more
able to provide collateral if – all else equal – its expected liquidation costs are
low, i.e. its assets are expected to fetch a good price in a fire sale. Hence, a
firm’s ability to raise collateralized debt improves when expected liquidation
costs are low. In contrast, when liquidation costs are expected to be high, we
expect that a firm will find it difficult to raise additional collateralized debt. A
firm may then reconsider its investment plans or resort to uncollateralized loans,
which are typically more expensive cf. Hubbard 1998.1
The connection between expected liquidation costs and the capital structure is
illustrated by Shleifer and Vishny 1992, who consider theoretically expected liq-
uidation costs for firms that operate in sectors characterised by mainly idiosyn-
cratic or industry-wide performance shocks. They argue that specifically in the
latter case fire sales attract few industry insiders, because that is the scenario
where all industry insiders face poor performance at the same time. In conjunc-
tion with sector specificity of assets this implies that liquidation costs are higher
for firms that operate in sectors with mainly industry-wide performance shocks.
Such firms have lower debt capacity as a result. Worthington 1995 explores the
role of sector specificity of assets in the connection between investment and fi-
nance empirically. She finds that firms operating in sectors for which assets are
highly specific or ‘sunk’ have more difficulty in raising external finance for in-
vestment. The contribution of the present paper is that we examine the role of
firm-specific liquidation cost perceptions on the dependence of investment on fi-
nance. Specifically, assuming sector specificity of assets, we consider whether
firms experience idiosyncratic or industry-wide performance shocks by taking the
cyclical performance of a firm relative to its direct environment as a measure of
the probability that assets may be sold to industry peers in a fire sale.
We estimate reduced-form investment equations on a balanced panel of 206
large Dutch firms. In addition to expected firm-specific liquidation costs, for
benchmarking purposes we also assess the impact of a few alternative firm-level
proxies for financing constraints on the sensitivity of investment to financial var-
iables. Our main empirical findings are the following. First, firms for which we
expect liquidation costs to be lowest are also the firms for which investment is
least dependent on increases in net worth, suggesting that costly liquidation is
linked with financing constraints in investment. Second, we find that firms with
low expected liquidation costs do not retain a typically large or small fraction of
earnings, nor are they particularly larger or smaller than their peers with high
expected liquidation costs. Their degree of leverage does not differ either. This
1 Borrowing without providing collateral may also lead to credit rationing cf. Stiglitz and Weiss
1981.
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leads us to conclude that costly liquidation has additional explanatory power over
other proxies for financing constraints – like retention practice, firm size, and le-
verage – that have frequently been used in the literature.2
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical analysis of
investment subject to financing constraints. In section 3 we discuss the theoreti-
cal connections between liquidation, finance, and investment. Here we also intro-
duce the data and describe our empirical measure of liquidation costs. Estimation
results are presented and discussed in section 4. There, we also examine to what
extent our classification of firms on the basis of liquidation costs reflects the in-
formation embedded in some well-known classification schemes. Section 5 sum-
marises and concludes.
2 THE EMPIRICAL INVESTMENT EQUATION
We characterise optimal firm-level investment with a simple sales accelerator type
investment model:
It
Kt 1
01
It 1
Kt 2
2 ln
St
St 1
3 ln
St
Kt 1
 t , 1
where I captures investment in fixed assets, S stands for sales, K for capital stock,
and  is an error term.3 Equation 1 is an empirical characterization of a capital
stock optimisation problem that does not consider the financing decision. This is
justified under the assumption of perfect capital markets so that the irrelevance
theorem holds. However, financing becomes non-trivial in the investment deci-
sion when firms face binding financing constraints. In the latter case, a proper
characterisation of investment should take into account the financing side as well.
In particular the investment decision now also depends on changes in internally
available funds cf. Fazzari et al. 1988. We add cash flow Cf to the invest-
ment equation to capture this financing channel. We expect cash flow to affect
investment positively – after controlling for investment opportunities – when fi-
nancing constraints are relevant and more strongly so when we expect firms to
2 For studies using retention practice, see for instance Fazzari et al. 1988, Oliner and Rudebusch
1990, Bond and Meghir 1994, Gilchrist and Himmelberg 1995, van Ees et al. 1998; for studies
using firm size see for instance Devereux and Schiantarelli 1990, Carpenter et al. 1994, Gilchrist
and Himmelberg 1995, Hu and Schiantarelli 1998, van Ees et al. 1998; for studies using lever-
age see for instance Whited 1992, van Ees et al. 1998, Hu and Schiantarelli 1998. Refer to
Schiantarelli 1996 or Hubbard 1998 for more elaborate overviews.
3 This investment function results for instance from a simple neo-classical demand-for-capital func-
tion, if we impose an ADL2,1 specification of the capital stock adjustment process, and disregard
changes in the real rental price of capital cf. Bond and van Reenen 1999. For alternative theo-
retical models resulting in empirical investment equations very similar to 1, see for instance Gale-
otti et al. 1994, Harris et al. 1994, or Schiantarelli and Sembenelli 2000.
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face binding constraints with a larger probability, for example because they have
higher expected liquidation costs. There is by now a lively debate in the litera-
ture concerning the interpretation of the excess sensitivity of investment to cash
flow. On the one hand, Erickson and Whited 2000 demonstrate that the empiri-
cal finding that investment of financially constrained firms is excessively sensi-
tive to cash flow may be due to a measurement error in investment opportunities.
On the other hand, Gilchrist and Himmelberg 1998 take into account that cash
flow may contain information about unobserved innovations in investment oppor-
tunities and still find patterns of investment cash flow sensitivity that are support-
ive of a financing constraints explanation. Our approach to limit the possibility
that cash flow accounts for unobserved investment opportunities captured by the
error term is to treat it as a potentially endogenous variable and instrument it
with lags of its own value.
Additionally, we implement the idea developed by Fazzari and Petersen 1993
that the impact of working capital investment  Wc in the fixed capital in-
vestment equation also signals the relevance of financing constraints. Here we
apply the idea that investment in working capital is important to the firm in ad-
dition to investment in fixed capital. Now suppose that, despite our use of an
instrumental variables approach, a positive cash flow sensitivity of investment is
still artificial and reflects nothing more than the correlation of predicted cash
flow with unobserved innovations in investment opportunities.4 In this scenario,
an unobserved improvement in investment opportunities would provide an incen-
tive for the firm to increase investment in both fixed and working capital. Hence,
unobserved innovations to investment opportunities would produce not only a
spurious positive correlation between cash flow and fixed capital formation, but
likewise between investment in fixed and working capital. Suppose, alternatively,
that a positive cash flow sensitivity correctly measures the impact of financing
constraints. Then, working capital competes with investment in fixed assets for a
limited pool of internal funds. Hence, investment in fixed capital – given the
amount of internal finance available – can be expanded only at the expense of
lower investment in working capital. A negative parameter estimate on working
capital investment is the result.
Investment in working capital is therefore added to the investment equation to
provide additional insight into the relevance of financing constraints. A negative
parameter estimate for working capital investment signals the competition of fixed
and working capital investment for limited internal resources and therefore sup-
ports the interpretation of a positive cash flow sensitivity of investment as stem-
4 For instance, cash flow may be a leading indicator of future investment opportunities. Then cash
flow predictions based on past cash flow realisations may still correlate with unobserved innovations
in investment opportunities.
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ming from financing constraints.5 Similar to the case of cash flow, we expect
working capital investment to compete particularly strongly with fixed assets for
funding when the firm has a larger probability of facing binding financing con-
straints. As in the case of cash flow, however, we have to consider the possibility
that working capital investment may be endogenous in the fixed capital invest-
ment equation. Specifically, the argument can be made that firms facing a posi-
tive shock to investment opportunities may reduce working capital investment not
because of binding financing constraints, but simply because this is the least
costly short-run adjustment.6 Hence we also instrument working capital invest-
ment with lags of its own value.
The empirical investment equation is then:
Iit
Ki t 1
0
Ii t 1
Ki t 2
1 ln
Sit
Si t 1
2 ln
Sit
Ki t 1
3
Cfit
Ki t 1
4
Wcit
Ki t 1
 it , 2
where the variables are indexed by firm i and year t,  it it is the
error term that contains both time t and firm i specific effects and a re-
sidual white noise term it.7
For unbiased estimates on sales growth and the sales-to-assets ratio, we also
instrument these variables appropriately in the empirical analysis. Lastly, since
lagged investment enters on the right hand side of the regression equation and
we model a firm specific error component, we have to consider and correct for
the correlation between lagged investment and the regression error. We use the
Arellano and Bond 1991 dynamic panel estimation methodology to compute
consistent parameter estimates and refer to Appendix A for the details.
3 LIQUIDATION, FINANCE, AND INVESTMENT
In this section we elaborate on the theoretical arguments that relate costly liqui-
dation to the interdependence of corporate investment and finance. Specifically,
in subsection 3.1 we first examine the role of costly liquidation on the cost of
external finance and subsequently we discuss how liquidation costs – via costly
reversibility – affect corporate investment demand. We then turn to the empirical
5 Furthermore, Fazzari and Petersen 1993 suggest that if working capital is excluded from the
empirical model, cash flow sensitivities may be underestimated.
6 See Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999 for a similar argument in the case of capital structure ad-
justment.
7 For the remainder of the analysis the book value of assets proxies for a firm’s capital stock, which
is an admissable, though imperfect proxy e.g. Weigand and Audretsch 1999.
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measurement of liquidation costs. In subsection 3.2 we introduce the data and in
subsection 3.3 we present and explain our proxy for liquidation costs.
3.1 Theoretical Considerations
Reversibility of investment affects both the demand for external funds and its
supply. We discuss these two issues in turn. On the one hand, costly liquidation
affects the interdependence of corporate investment and finance via the supply of
costly external finance. Shleifer and Vishny 1992 illustrate the argument theo-
retically by considering expected liquidation costs for firms that operate in sec-
tors characterised by mainly idiosyncratic or industry-wide performance shocks.
In case of idiosyncratic shocks, firms forced to liquidate likely find well-perform-
ing industry peers – considered to be the next-best users of a firm’s assets – who
are interested in purchasing its assets. These industry peers are willing to pay a
price close to the true value of the assets. In contrast, if performance shocks are
mainly industry-wide, industry peers find no interest in purchasing the assets of a
liquidating firm. Then, assets must be sold to industry outsiders at values below
their true value. The discount arises from the lower value that industry outsiders
derive from a firm’s specific assets, but also from their fear to overpay as they
cannot value them properly effectively considering these assets as lemons. This
makes liquidation costly and assets less valuable as collateral to loans. The result
is rising marginal costs of debt and possibly a lower debt capacity or a binding
debt capacity constraint cf. Hubbard 1998. For a given demand for invest-
ment, therefore, we expect firms to be more financially constrained when liqui-
dation costs are higher.
On the other hand, costly liquidation associates with costly reversibility, or
partial irreversibility, because of the wedge it drives between purchase and sell-
ing price of a firm’s capital stock eg. Abel and Eberly 1994. Let us briefly
consider how costly reversibility affects a firm’s optimal investment demand. Dixit
and Pindyck 1994 consider costly reversibility of investment when the firm has
the option to invest now or wait until uncertainty over the profitability of invest-
ment is resolved. Uncertainty in combination with costly reversibility may delay
investment when there is an option to start the same project at a later date. This
lowers current investment demand and – in a financing constraints setting with a
given level of internal funds – reduces the probability that a firm is in need of
costly external finance.
Theoretically, therefore, the impact of costly liquidation on the probability that
firms experience financing constraints is ambiguous. On the one hand, high liq-
uidation costs limit the supply of external funds and/or raise its price. Through
this supply channel, liquidation costs increase the probability that firms face fi-
nancing constraints. Hence the sensitivity of investment to cash flow rises with
expected liquidation costs when this channel dominates. On the other hand, costly
liquidation makes waiting more valuable and reduces current investment demand.
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This lowers the demand for external funds and results in a lower probability that
firms face financing constraints. We thus hypothesise empirically that if this de-
mand channel dominates, then the cash flow sensitivity of investment for firms
with the highest expected liquidation costs should be lowest. Which of these two
channels dominates must ultimately be assessed empirically.
3.2 The Data
In the empirical analysis we make use of Statistics Netherlands’ SFGO sample,
which collects balance sheet and income statement data on a nonrandom sample
of Dutch firms. The sample is devised to collect information on the entire popu-
lation of Dutch firms for which the total balance sheet length exceeds DFL 20
million in current prices. In practice, the annual response rate is roughly eighty
percent, so that the SFGO sample includes nearly 30,000 firm-years of observa-
tion, covering the period 1977-1997. We extract from this sample a balanced
panel of Dutch manufacturing firms sectors 20-39 according to SBI74 classifi-
cation. In this, we follow the majority of papers in this field of research. Due to
attrition, we only select the years ranging from 1983 to 1996 so that we have
information on all the relevant variables in the investment equation for a total of
206 firms.
Our sample thus consists very clearly of particularly large Dutch firms. Fur-
thermore, the choice for a balanced panel possibly selects from this data the most
financially healthy firms and likely also the most mature firms. Large and mature
firms are typically regarded to face the smallest premium on external finance.8 In
terms of the present analysis, therefore, we may be using a sample that is par-
ticularly biased against finding any effects of financing constraints in investment.
Hence our estimated investment cash flow sensitivities are conservative and the
implied relevance of liquidation costs in explaining financing constraints should
be considered as a lower bound of its importance in the representative Dutch
manufacturing firm.
3.3 Measuring Liquidation Costs
We compute an empirical measure of expected liquidation costs that corroborates
with Worthington’s 1995 empirical application of asset liquidity to the depen-
dence of corporate investment on the availability of finance. Specifically, Wor-
thington 1995 argues that liquidation costs are expected to be higher for firms
that operate assets that are highly specific or ‘sunk,’ which translates empirically
into firms operating assets for which an active second-hand or rental market is
8 See for instance Devereux and Schiantarelli 1990, Oliner and Rudebusch 1992, Schaller 1993,
Carpenter et al. 1994, Galeotti et al. 1994, Chirinko and Schaller 1995, Gilchrist and Himmel-
berg 1995 and 1998, Hubbard et al. 1995, and Jaramillo et al. 1996.
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lacking. Worthington assesses the extent of a second-hand or rental market on a
sectoral basis. We agree with the emphasis on asset specificity in the explanation
of financing constraints, but feel uncomfortable with a sectoral assessment of liq-
uidation costs, as it by-passes interesting within-sector variation in expected liq-
uidation costs.
Instead, we propose a measure of liquidation costs that emphasizes to what
extent firms suffer from idiosyncratic or industry-wide performance shocks. With
this emphasis, liquidation costs may differ widely between firms in the same sec-
tor, as is already illustrated by Shleifer and Vishny’s 1992 prediction that
‘growth assets such as high technology firms and cyclical assets ... are illiquid
because industry buyers of these assets are likely to be themselves severely credit
constrained when the owners of these assets need to sell’ Shleifer and Vishny
1992, p. 1359. While some economic sectors are clearly more technologically
advanced than others – suggesting sector-specific liquidation costs – also within
sectors there are technological leaders and laggards. We therefore characterize liq-
uidation costs at the firm level as proposed by Guiso and Parigi 1999 and ‘con-
struct an indicator of asset liquidity at the firm level by measuring the corre-
lation of output of the firm with its industry’ Guiso and Parigi 1999, p. 208.
The higher this correlation, the more firm performance comoves with industry
performance, resulting in lower asset liquidity and higher expected liquidation
costs. Comovement – which is how we label this correlation for the remainder of
this analysis – relates to liquidation costs by the following argument. High-co-
movement firms perform exceptionally well when the sector as a whole performs
well, but also perform exceptionally poor when the sector as a whole performs
poorly. Hence, when the high-comovement firm approaches financial distress, its
industry peers – due to asset specificity the next-best users of its assets – also
experience poor performance, resulting in high expected liquidation costs for
high-comovement firms.
One explanation of why some firms display high and others low comovement
may be offered in terms of differing technological or innovative content of the
product sold. Along this line of reasoning, high comovement firms offer products
of average technological or innovative content in large quantities, which makes
them susceptible to demand constraints and implies that their sales follow indus-
try performance. In contrast, low comovement firms – by offering products of
either superior or inferior technological or innovative content – operate on sepa-
rate segments of the sector’s sales market and are therefore less susceptible to
demand constraints. Unfortunately, our data lack information on product hetero-
geneity and hence do not allow us to explore this conjecture empirically.
It is important to stress at this point that an empirical measure of expected
liquidation costs results from the cyclical performance of a firm relative to its
industry peers. As such, we do not intend to sort out as high-comovement firms
those firms that perform well on average. Rather, we intend to sort out the firms
that perform well when the sector as a whole performs well, but perform poorly
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when the performance of the sector deteriorates. Put differently, firms that per-
form well regardless of what happens to sector performance are unlikely to score
points in terms of comovement.9
The innovative feature of our measure of expected liquidation costs is that it
is specific to a firm and builds on the relation between a firm and its environ-
ment. Specifically, we measure comovement as the correlation between firm and
industry real sales growth rates.10 To that end, we sort the 206 firms in our sample
into nineteen 2-digit manufacturing sectors and obtain sector real sales growth
rates from Statistics Netherlands see Appendix B for computational details. We
use the period 1983-1991 to compute comovement.11 The resulting comovement
variable varies from –0.90 to 0.92 among firms, but for each firm separately it is
a constant. Mean and median comovement is 0.07 and 0.11, respectively. We ad-
mit that the 9-year correlation between firm and sector sales as a proxy for the
cyclical performance of a firm relative to its peers likely contains some noise.
For that reason, we do not want to consider uninformatively small differences in
comovement as differences in the expected liquidation costs of a firm cf. Fazzari
et al. 2000. Instead, for the remainder of the analysis we define three relatively
broad classes of comovement. We consider firms with comovement measures
among the bottom 25 percent of the comovement distribution to display low co-
movement for these firms comovement is below –0.21. Similarly, the top 25
percent of this distribution is considered to display high comovement for these
firms comovement is in excess of 0.36. The remaining firms constitute our ref-
erence group; they display medium comovement.
Table 1 indicates which types of firms are considered to be financially con-
strained on the basis of comovement. Investment is roughly equal for low and
medium comovement firms, but considerably lower for high comovement firms.
This observation is supportive of a financing constraints explanation; costly ex-
ternal finance curtails a firm’s investment. We also observe from the table that
high-comovement firms display a slower sales growth and a lower rate of long
term debt accumulation. Especially this last observation fits the hypothesis that
comovement associates with financing constraints through a lower expected liq-
uidation value of a firm’s assets: more costly liquidation makes assets less valu-
able as collateral to loans and thus hampers debt accumulation. At the same time,
9 In the next section we will demonstrate empirically that our classification of firms as least or most
likely to face financing constraints on the basis of comovement does not mimic the results of a clas-
sification based on average firm-level sales growth.
10 Alternatively, we have measured comovement as the correlation between firm and industry real
sales levels. This does not change any of the conclusions that we draw later on, however.
11 We can only use the 1983-1992 or the 1993-1996 period to compute this correlation due to a
revision of the standard industry classification from 1992 to 1993. We use the longer period to mini-
mise the impact of outliers and get a better estimate of structural comovement. We omit 1992 to
ensure that the estimation period is long enough as discussed later in section 4.2. Furthermore, due to
data limitations we cannot compute comovement for fourteen firms see Appendix B.
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the information in Table 1 cannot discard an explanation along the lines of irre-
versible investment. Specifically, with a valuable option to delay investment,
planned investment should also be lower for high-comovement firms. A lower
investment demand furthermore reduces a firm’s demand for external funds, which
then explains its lower rate of long-term debt accumulation. Distinguishing be-
TABLE 1 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 1983-1991
All Firms Comovement
Low Medium High
Investment 0.082 0.084 0.086 0.072
0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003
0.064 0.067 0.064 0.054
Sales growth 0.049 0.058 0.051 0.039
0.005 0.009 0.008 0.011
0.049 0.058 0.048 0.046
Sales-assets ratio 0.310 0.336 0.269 0.409
0.013 0.022 0.020 0.027
0.365 0.388 0.322 0.475
Cash flow 0.061 0.058 0.059 0.058
0.003 0.006 0.005 0.006
0.078 0.082 0.077 0.068
Working capital 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.014
0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005
0.012 0.159 0.009 0.013
Long-term debt 0.125 0.117 0.134 0.116
0.003 0.007 0.005 0.006
0.087 0.073 0.092 0.083
Long-term debt 0.006 0.018 0.005 0.001
0.003 0.009 0.003 0.003
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 206 48 96 48
Notes: variable means are reported, standard errors are in parentheses, medians in square
brackets. Investment is defined as changes in tangible fixed assets due to purchase or pro-
duction over total assets; Sales growth is the first difference of the natural logarithm of
total sales; Sales-assets ratio is the log of sales less the log of total assets; Cash flow
measures earnings after interest and taxes, but before depreciation and dividends over total
assets; Working capital measures investment in cash, inventories and short term claims
less short-term debt relative to total assets; Long term debt is the change in long-term
debt over total assets. Comovement is low when the firm-industry sales growth correlation
is less than –0.206 the 25th percentile, it is medium when this correlation is in between
–0.206 and 0.363 the 75th percentile and it is high when the correlation exceeds 0.363.
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tween these two alternative explanations requires a more careful look at the in-
vestment decision, to which we turn now.
4 ESTIMATION RESULTS
4.1 Comovement and Financing Constraints
We estimate equation 2 for the period 1986-1996 and present the estimation
results in Table 2.12 A noteworthy observation in the estimates reported in col-
umn 1 pertains to the significant and negative estimate on sales growth, which
is counterintuitive and likely follows from the omission of non-linear cash flow
effects note that sales growth has a positive estimated parameter in columns 2
to 5. Furthermore, note that the effects of cash flow positive and working
capital investment negative have the expected signs and are also statistically
significant. As explained in section 2, we are particularly interested in the effects
on investment of these two variables for firms that are most and least likely to
face financing constraints. Hence, we have interacted these variables with dum-
mies indicating low comovement DLC  and high comovement DHC  in columns
2 and 3 of the table.
The results in column 2 show that investment of low comovement firms is
less sensitive to the inflow of cash than investment of medium and high comove-
ment firms, but the same applies to the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for
the high comovement firms relative to medium comovement firms. Similar re-
sults obtain when interactions with working capital investment are added to the
empirical investment equation, as shown in column 3. There we observe that
for low comovement firms working capital investment is least threatening as a
competitor to investment in fixed assets for internal funds.13 As before for cash
flow, however, working capital investment is also less threatening as a competitor
for high comovement firms when compared to the medium comovement firms.
These results support our conjecture that low comovement associates with a
relatively high value of a firm’s assets as collateral to loans. Put differently, the
interaction effects with DLC support the dominance of the supply channel – dis-
cussed in section 3.1 – arguing that although these are the firms for which the
12 Including lagged investment in the regression equation; requiring at least the presence of invest-
ment lagged two periods as an instrument, and; first-differencing in the estimation procedure each
consume 1 year of data. Note that none of the specification tests in the table reject 1 our assumption
concerning the absence of serial correlation in the error term, or 2 our choice of instruments. Refer
to Appendix A for a more elaborate exposition of the econometric methods.
13 The magnitude of the parameter estimate is much lower than that presented in for instance Faz-
zari and Petersen 1993. Their estimate, derived from a Q-model, is –0.43 –0.18 for uncon-
strained firms. For regressions including sales, they still find a working capital impact of –0.22. Our
findings are more in line with Weigand and Audretsch 1999, who find a working capital impact on
investment of –0.12 within a reduced-form investment equation approach.
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TABLE 2 – SALES COMOVEMENT AND FINANCING CONSTRAINTS
Explanatory variables 1986-1996 1992-1996
1 2 3 4 5
Investmentt–1 0.488 0.464 0.463 0.522 0.525
0.007 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008
Sales growtht 0.025 0.004 0.004 0.021 0.022
0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004
Sales-assets ratiot 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Cash flowt 0.084 0.102 0.125 0.037 0.053
0.005 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.008
Working capitalt 0.134 0.137 0.214 0.056 0.124
0.006 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.013
DLC  Cash flowt 0.063 0.084 0.018 0.027
0.005 0.006 0.009 0.011
DLC  Working capitalt 0.134 0.105
0.012 0.013
DHC  Cash flowt 0.040 0.059 0.026 0.021
0.006 0.007 0.010 0.014
DHC  Working capitalt 0.090 0.050
0.011 0.020
Firms 192 192 192 192 192
Observations 2112 2112 2112 960 960
Constant included YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies included YES YES YES YES YES
Joint significance 2 5 
7890.59**
2 7
22297.69**
2 9
21494.83**
2 7
7000.54**
2 9
7791.79**
Sargan 2 144
161.67
2 190
179.17
2 188
178.03
2 123
138.42
2 121
134.96
SOSC 0.26 0.46 0.52 0.41 0.47
DSargan Yt–2  2 11
9.47
2 11
2.59
2 11
4.34
2 5
5.28
2 5
4.34
DSargan Xt–1  2 44
48.53
2 88
61.00
2 88
62.23
2 40
46.48
2 40
44.62
Notes: GMM estimates of Investmentt, defined as before. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses. DLC HC is a dummy that takes value 1
when the firm is in the lowest highest comovement quartile in the 1983-1991 period and
0 otherwise. All other variables are defined as before. The instrument set for the column
1 estimates consists of Investment lagged two and three periods and Sales growth, Sales-
assets ratio, Cash flow, and Working capital lagged one, two and three periods. The in-
strument set for the column 4 and 5 estimates additionally includes DLC HC  Cash
flow and DLC HC  Working capital lagged one, two and three periods. The instrument
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demand for external finance is probably strongest, the superior collateral value of
their assets facilitates access to external funding and reduces the incidence of fi-
nancing constraints. More importantly, these are not the expected results if co-
movement affects investment primarily – via partial irreversibility – through the
demand channel. Then the interaction effects with DLC should have pointed in
the other direction.
In contrast, for high comovement firms, the demand channel appears impor-
tant. According to this channel, high comovement firms choose a more cautious
investment path, which results in them running into binding financing constraints
less often. This explains why our empirical results show that their investment is
less sensitive to the generation of cash flow and why working capital investment
appears less threatening as a competitor to investment in fixed assets for internal
funds.
We support this seemingly contradictory explanation of the results by noting
that the estimation period contains a reasonable period in the eighties, where un-
certainty concerning the economic recovery may have had a strong influence on
both the access of firms to external sources of finance and their conservatism in
seizing uncertain investment opportunities. This conjecture is inspected in col-
umns 4 and 5, where we report estimates for the period 1992-1996.14 At least
three features of these results are interesting in this regard. First, the sensitivity
of investment to cash flow is considerably lower in this sub period than it was
before when assessed over the entire sample period. This suggests that financing
constraints were indeed less relevant during the period 1992-1996 than they were
in the second half of the eighties.15 Second, for high comovement firms the re-
14 This estimation period conveniently coincides with the one used and motivated in the next sub-
section.
15 Credit and stock market information confirms the claim that the 1992-1996 period was more
favourable for firms to attract external finance than the years before. For instance due to favourable
stock price developments, proceeds from stock issues for firms from 1992 onwards – excepting 1995

set for the column 2 and 3 estimates is similar, but excludes the third lags of all ex-
planatory variables excluding lagged Investment to prevent an explosion of the number
of instruments. Joint significance for all variables in the model except for a constant and
the time dummies is tested with a Wald test. Sargan refers to the Sargan test for overi-
dentifying restrictions and is also heteroskedasticity-consistent cf. Arellano and Bond
1991. SOSC tests for second-order autocorrelation and is based on estimates of the re-
siduals in first differences cf. Arellano and Bond 1998. The Difference Sargan DSar-
gan statistics restrict the instrument set. Defining the instrument set upon which the esti-
mates are based as Yt–2, Yt–3, Xt–1, Xt–2, Xt–3 with X the vector of explanatory variables,
DSargan Yt–2  excludes Yt–2 from this set and re-assesses the overidentifying restrictions.
Refer to Appendix A for a more elaborate exposition of the estimation procedure and the
test statistics. For all test statistics, significance at the 5 and 1 percent error level is indi-
cated by * and **, respectively.
33INVESTMENT AND FINANCE WHEN LIQUIDATION IS COSTLY
sults suggest that the supply channel effect now dominates – as it did and still
does for low comovement firms – since interactions of DHC with cash flow have
changed sign compared to columns 2 and 3 and are now significantly posi-
tive.16 This is in line with the view that uncertainty regarding the timing of eco-
nomic recovery may have been relevant in the second half of the eighties, but
was largely resolved in the 1992-1996 period. The third interesting observation
bolsters this conclusion. Namely, firms respond more strongly to expected prof-
itability of investment when there is a low degree of aggregate uncertainty and
financing constraints are alleviated, which shows in the significant and positive
responsiveness of investment to sales growth in the 1992-1996 period.
4.2 Comovement: Old Wine in New Bottles?
The aim of this paper is to understand to what extent costly liquidation affects
the dependence of investment on cash flow. To the extent that our classification
on comovement sorts out typical firms in terms of leverage, maturity, or retention
practice, however, it has no additional explanatory power over these alternative
proxies for the extent to which firms face financing constraints. For the remain-
der of this section, therefore, we consider three firm-specific classification
schemes that have frequently appeared in the literature to identify constrained
firms. First, we check whether they sort out as constrained the same firms that
we sorted out using comovement. Second, we briefly assess whether they asso-
ciate with observed investment cash flow sensitivity patterns as is documented in
the literature.
We have argued that comovement reduces the value of a firm’s assets as col-
lateral to loans. This makes high comovement firms more likely to run into bind-
ing debt capacity constraints. Insofar as high comovement sorts out low leverage
firms and vice versa as a result, our findings merely repeat those obtained from a
split on leverage as studied by for instance Whited 1992 and Hu and Schian-
tarelli 1998. Hence we consider the dependence of leverage and comovement
classifications. Furthermore, to the extent that young firms perform more volatile
relative to mature firms, comovement may also sort out firms on the basis of
maturity. While we have no direct measure of the maturity of the firms in our
sample, we assume that mature firms are typically large and retain a relatively
– were 3 to 7 times larger than those in the years 1986-1991 source: De Nederlandsche Bank. Fur-
thermore, the growth of credit granted by financial institutions to the private sector – more or less
constant up to the end of 1993 – started picking up and increased up until late 1998 source: De
Nederlandsche Bank. See for instance van Ees et al. 1997 for an empirical demonstration of fi-
nancing constraints being more relevant in bust periods than in boom periods.
16 Note, though, that the interaction term with working capital investment still has the wrong sign
in this respect.
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small fraction of earnings i.e. they pay generous dividends.17 This motivates an
assessment of the dependence of size, retention and comovement classifications.
When sorting firms on the basis of easily adjustable variables such as the re-
tention rate or leverage but also size through takeovers and divestitures we must
consider the possibility that firms self-select into the constrained or unconstrained
classes following unobserved innovations in investment opportunities. Hence we
distinguish between a classification and an estimation period in order to ensure
that the classification scheme is reasonably exogenous to the investment decision
of the firm.18 We classify firms during the years 1983-1991 and estimate equa-
tion 2 over the remaining period 1992-1996. On the one hand this relatively
long classification period ensures that if we classify a firm to be constrained dur-
ing this period, it is likely to reflect a more or less structural status, which in-
creases the likelihood that such a firm remains constrained for a substantial part
of the estimation period. The latter period, on the other hand, is still sufficiently
long to obtain meaningful parameter estimates and coincides with the period for
which comovement results are reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the distribution of firms across constrained and un-
constrained classes.19 We note that the size classification effectively sorts out the
45 largest Dutch firms: the average value of total assets for large firms in 1991
was NLG 2,974 million, as compared to NLG 196 million for the other firms.
This reflects the structure of the Dutch corporate sector well, where there is a
small group of very large multinationals. It also sorts out the most mature firms,
which have access to external finance not only through Dutch, but also through
international capital markets. Our leverage classification sorts out 52 highly le-
veraged firms with an average debt to assets ratio of 0.65. For the remaining 154
firms, the corresponding figure is only 0.44.
For the purpose of the present analysis, we are specifically interested in the
extent to which the status of a firm according to our comovement classification is
independent from the status of a firm according to an alternative classification
17 See footnote 8 for studies on size and maturity in relation to financing constraints. The notion
that high retention firms are more likely to face binding financing constraints is well-established. See
for instance Fazzari et al. 1988, Oliner and Rudebusch 1992, Bond and Meghir 1994, Hubbard
et al. 1995, Elston 1996, and van Ees et al. 1998 to name just a few.
18 Note that it is more difficult to imagine that firms can or want to adjust the way they operate
relative to their environment following such innovations, which is why we did not stress this distinc-
tion in the analysis of comovement’s effect on investment behaviour.
19 Retention practice could not be determined for 5 firms as they had not issued shares for a mean-
ingful part of the classification period. Also, Fazzari et al. 1988 consider a medium retention class
and we do not, because only 10 firms satisfy the criterion i.e. retention rates of 80-90% and wid-
ening this medium class to retention rates of 75-90% and even 70-90% did not solve this problem
sufficiently. For size and leverage, separate low and medium classes were identified, but merged on
the basis of initial estimation results.
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scheme.20 Panel B therefore presents statistics on the degree of association be-
tween the rank orders that result from our classifications. Specifically, the top-
right shows Pearson’s 2 to indicate whether the distribution of firms across con-
strained and unconstrained classes is independent for any pair of classification
schemes. The bottom left reports Spearman’s 	 to indicate the direction of asso-
ciation between the status of a firm in any two classification schemes see Ap-
pendix C for the details. From the first row we conclude that independence of
the comovement classification and any one of the alternative classifications can-
20 As such, for example the explanatory power of liquidation costs in the firm’s capital structure –
i.e. the correlation of the raw comovement data with raw leverage ratios – is not a topic that falls
within the main scope of this paper.
TABLE 3 – WHAT COMOVEMENT DOES NOT PROXY FOR
Panel A Alternative classifications of firms
Comovement Retention Size Leverage
Low/Small 48 192 161 154
Medium 96
High/Large 48 82 45 52
Total 192 201 206 206
Panel B The relationships among alternative classifications
Comovement Retention Size Leverage
Comovement 2 2 2.064 2 2 0.093 2 2 3.370
Retention 0.054 2 1 4.689* 2 1 16.116**
Size 0.018 0.153* 2 1 1.997
Leverage 0.017 0.283** 0.098
Notes: all classification schemes use the 1983-1991 period. Comovement is low, medium,
and high as defined before. Retention is high if the firm paid out less than ten percent of
earnings in dividends in 6 years or more. A firm is large when the value of its assets is
above the 75th percentile of the total assets distribution of its 2-digit SBI93 sector for 6
years or more. Leverage is high when the firm’s average leverage ratio is above the 75th
percentile of the sample. Independence of pairs of classifications is assessed using a non-
parametric goodness-of-fit test based on the difference between observed and expected clas-
sification frequencies under the null of independence: the upper-right triangle reports the
concomitant Pearson 2 test statistics. The lower-left triangle reports Spearman’s 	 to in-
dicate the direction of association between any pair of classification criteria. Refer to Ap-
pendix C for more details on and the contingency tables underlying Pearsons 2 and Spear-
man’s 	. Significance at the 5 and 1 percent error level is indicated by * and **,
respectively.
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not be rejected at conventional levels of confidence.21 Dependence is more mean-
ingful and correlations considerably higher among the alternative classifications;
firms that retain a relatively small fraction of earnings are typically large and
have low leverage ratios.
21 As indicated in the previous section, one may suspect a connection between our comovement
classification and a sales growth classification Hubbard and Kashyap 1992, van Ees et al. 1997,
and Elston 1998 all associate financing constraints with poor growth performance. However, apply-
ing Pearson’s test of independence to our comovement classification and a simple sales growth clas-
sification provides no indication of statistical dependence. See appendix C for the contingency table.
TABLE 4 – ALTERNATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS AND FINANCING CONSTRAINTS: 1992-1996
Retention Size Leverage
Investmentt–1 0.579 0.546 0.529
0.010 0.011 0.010
Sales growtht 0.002 0.003 0.006
0.005 0.005 0.006
Sales-assets ratiot 0.012 0.012 0.012
0.002 0.002 0.001
Cash flowt 0.009 0.059 0.031
0.016 0.010 0.013
Working capitalt 0.122 0.093 0.096
0.020 0.016 0.019
DHigh/Large  Cash flowt 0.080 0.045 0.070
0.016 0.012 0.013
DHigh/Large  Working capitalt 0.029 0.013 0.016
0.026 0.022 0.021
Firms 201 206 206
Observations 1005 1030 1030
Constant included YES YES YES
Year dummies included YES YES YES
Joint significance 2 7 6970.78** 2 7 6019.40** 2 7 7326.68**
Sargan 2 93 102.76 2 93 109.05 2 93 100.42
SOSC 0.61 0.31 0.12
DSargan Yt–2  2 5 3.00 2 5 1.27 2 5 2.86
DSargan Xt–1  2 30 27.87 2 30 37.29 2 30 31.07
Notes: GMM estimates of Investmentt, defined as before. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses. See Table 3 for the definition of the respec-
tive dummies and Table 1 for that of all other variables. The instrument sets consist of
Investment lagged two and three periods and all other variables including interaction
terms lagged one, two and three periods. See Table 2 for the interpretation of the test
statistics.
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We also apply the firm-specific classification schemes to our empirical invest-
ment equation and report the estimation results in Table 4. We find investment
cash flow sensitivity patterns that are very much in line with findings well-docu-
mented in the literature. In particular, we find that investment of high retention
firms is most sensitive to cash flow. The observation from Table 3 that these firms
are typically small and have high leverage ratios is also reflected in the findings
that the investment of small firms and heavily indebted firms is most sensitive to
cash flow.
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Liquidation is costly and a firm’s investment decision may reflect the incidence
of these costs. In this paper we have demonstrated that liquidation costs – esti-
mated as the firm-industry sales comovement – influence the sensitivity of a firm’s
investment decision to financial factors. In particular, in the empirical evaluation
of the investment equation low liquidation costs are clearly associated with a
lower sensitivity of corporate investment to financial variables. Specifically, the
cash flow sensitivity of investment is lowest for firms with relatively weak co-
movement. We find mixed and inconclusive evidence for high-comovement firms.
Using firm-industry sales comovement as our measure of liquidation costs, we
emphasise the way the firm performs in relation to its environment in explaining
the working of financing constraints. In this regard we want to point out that
classification schemes using firm-level characteristics such as leverage, retention
practice and size – although they associate with excess sensitivity patterns in a
way that is in line with the literature – do not associate with our classification
using comovement. This is true even though amongst themselves, these classifi-
cations on firm-specific characteristics tell more or less the same story; it is typi-
cally the mature firm – the one that has grown large, that pays generous divi-
dends, and has a relatively low leverage ratio – that decides on investment mostly
independent of financial considerations. Comovement therefore adds new insights
into the working of financing constraints: it is the way the firm performs relative
to its environment that essentially drives the dependence of investment on inter-
nal finance by making liquidation, and concomitantly external finance, costly.
APPENDIX A
GMM ESTIMATION OF THE DYNAMIC INVESTMENT EQUATION
The aim of this appendix is to illustrate the basic procedure used in this paper
for the estimation of a dynamic panel data model, not to provide an exhaustive
overview of dynamic panel data estimation. Readers interested in further details
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on the methodology used in this paper are referred to Arellano and Bond 1991
and 1998.
The model we estimate is a single equation with individual effects of the
form:
yityi t 1 xit ti it , A1
where  and  are individual and time specific effects, respectively xit is a vector
of explanatory variables – that can be strictly exogenous, predetermined, or en-
dogenous with respect to it – with  the vector of associated parameters. The
number of time periods available on each firm T  is 14 when we use all avail-
able years in the sample. The number of firms N  is at most 206 and varies
when we consider alternative classification schemes, as explained in the main text.
Let us express the investment equation for firm i as
yiWi
 ii it , A2
where 
 is a vector that includes , the ’s and the ’s, and Wi contains vectors
of the lagged dependent variable, the xit’s and the time dummies. i is a vector of
ones to capture the firm-specific effect. In estimating a dynamic model, we are
particularly concerned with the possible correlation between the explanatory var-
iables and the firm-specific effect. Therefore, to make a search for instruments
uncorrelated with the specific effects redundant see Arellano and Bond 1998
for a more elaborate discussion, first differences are taken of equation A2. Let
Wi* and yi* denote first-differences of Wi and yi. GMM estimates of 
 then have
the general form

| 	
i
Wi* Zi AN 	
i
ZiWi*  1	
i
Wi* Zi AN 	
i
Ziyi* , A3
where Zi is a matrix that contains all variables used as instruments and
AN 1N 	i ZiHi Zi  1 A4
with Hi a weighing matrix. We compute one-step estimates where we use
HiHi1
2  1  0 0
 1 2  0 0
    
0 0  2  1
0 0   1 2
 . A5
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The results reported in the main text are two-step estimates with heteroskedas-
ticity-consistent standard errors, which uses
HiHi2 ˆi* ˆi*  , A6
where ˆi* are one-step residuals.
The consequence of the first-differencing transformation on the choice of the
instrument set is the following. Ignoring the explanatory variables and the time
effects, first-differencing of equation A1 yields
yit yi t 1 yi t 1  yi t 2  it i t 1 . A7
Since yit 2 and further lags of the level of yi are uncorrelated with it it 1
they are valid instruments, provided that the it are serially uncorrelated. This
condition is checked by assessing whether second order serial correlation is ab-
sent in the first-differenced residuals, i.e.
Eit i t 1 i t 2  i t 3  0 A8
refer to Arellano and Bond 1991 for technical details and proof of the proper-
ties of this test and further tests discussed in this appendix. More generally, in-
strument validity is assessed using Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions:
S 	
i
ˆi
* Zi AN 	
i
Zi ˆi* , A9
which is asymptotically chi-squared distributed with as many degrees of freedom
as there are overidentifying restrictions. This test checks whether Ei* Zi is suf-
ficiently close to zero. The validity of subsets of instruments in Zi can be as-
sessed using difference Sargan tests. Let ZIi be a subset of Zi , where we have
dropped suspected invalid instruments. SI is the accompanying Sargan test statis-
tic:
SI 	
i
ˆIi
* ZIi AIN 	
i
ZIi ˆIi*  . A10
Then the difference Sargan test compares the Sargan test statistic for the full set
of instruments A9 with the Sargan test statistic for the restricted set of instru-
ments A10: DSargan S SI , which has as many degrees of freedom as the
number of restrictions imposed on the instrument set and equals the difference
in overidentifying restrictions for the two tests.
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APPENDIX B
MEASURING FIRM-INDUSTRY SALES COMOVEMENT
We consider the following sectors sectors 20-39 in the SBI74 classification:
Food and goodies 20/21, Textile 22, Clothing 23, Leather, shoes and leath-
erware 24, Wood and furniture 25, Paper and related 26, Graphic industry
and publishers 27, Petroleum 28, Chemical 29, Synthetic strings and fibres
30, Rubber and synthetics processing 31, Building materials, pottery, glass
32, Basic metal 33, Metal products 34, Machines 35, Electronics 36,
Transports 37, Optical instruments 38, and Other 39. The sector sales data
at the two-digit SBI74 level can be found in ‘Samenvattend overzicht van de
industrie, K-160.’ Price information is confidential.
We cannot compute our measure of comovement for firms in sectors 27 and
38 as price indices are not available for these sectors and hence sales cannot be
deflated. Fourteen firms are in these two sectors. In addition, sales data are not
available for sectors 20 and 21 separately, but only for both sectors jointly. There-
fore, we deflate these combined sector sales with the average price index of the
two sectors and treat these two sectors as a single one. The correlation of the
price indices of the individual sectors is nearly 90 percent in levels and 70 per-
cent in growth rates. Therefore, the loss in accuracy using the aggregate deflator
is probably not large. For sectors 29 and 30 sales are likewise not reported for
the sectors separately but only for the two sectors jointly. Moreover, the price
index for sector 30 is unavailable as well. Since approximately ten percent of our
sample consists of firms in sector 29 but none in sector 30, we are reluctant to
eliminate these observations. Instead, we deflate the combined sales of sectors 29
and 30 with the price index for sector 29. Our estimation results presented in the
next section are not affected by excluding sectors 29 and 30. To save space we
do not report these.
APPENDIX C
TESTING THE INDEPENDENCE OF CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA
The contingency of one classification on another is assessed using the Pearson 2
test for independence. Let ij denote the underlying bivariate probability distri-
bution. For illustration, if i denotes a firm’s classification based on comovement
and j denotes its classification based on retention, then LH is the probability that
a firm has low comovement in combination with high retention. Let i and j
denote the marginal distributions. Then the null hypothesis of statistical indepen-
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dence of any pair of classification criteria is H0  ijij . With the estimated
bivariate probability distribution Pij and marginal distributions Pi and Pj , we ex-
pect Pi Pj nEij observations in the ith row and the jth column of the contin-
gency table. Pearson’s 2 test for independence is based on the difference be-
tween observed and expected frequencies:
Pearson’s 2
	
i
	
j
OijEij2
Eij
d.f.  I 1J 1 ,
where I and J are the number of rows and columns in the contingency table,
respectively.
Because rejection of the null provides no indication of the direction of asso-
ciation between classification criteria, we also report Spearman’s 	, a measure of
correlation between rank orders. Together, Pearson’s 2 and Spearman’s 	 pro-
vide an assessment of the dependence of any pair of classification criteria, as
well as an indication of the direction of association between them. Table A1
shows the contingency tables used to compute these statistics as reported in Table
3 in the main text for comovement, retention practice, size and leverage as clas-
sification criteria. Table A2 shows the contingency table for comovement and a
sales growth classification.
TABLE A1 – CONTINGENCY TABLES USED TO ASSESS INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN PAIRS
OF CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA
Retention Size Leverage
Low High Small Large Low High
Comovement Low 31 16 38 10 38 10
Medium 49 43 76 20 66 30
High 28 20 37 11 39 9
Retention Low 88 31 102 17
High 71 11 50 32
Size Small 124 37
Large 30 15
Note: observed frequencies in cells.
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TABLE A2 – CONTINGENCY TABLE COMOVEMENT – AVERAGE SALES GROWTH
Growth
Low Medium High
Comovement Low 8 25 15 Pearson’s 2 4
P-value
Spearman’s 	
P-value
3.05
0.55
0.09
0.20
Medium 27 47 22
High 14 22 12
Note: observed frequencies in cells. A firm’s growth rate is low high when its average
annual sales growth rate is below above the 25th 75th  percentile of the sample during
the period 1983-1991. Low growth firms exhibit an average annual sales growth rate of
12.6%, medium growth firms grew at an average 5.2% and low growth firms contracted
annually by 3.3%.
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